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A large proportion of the space industry is moribund with long development cycles, high, rising (or at best 
stagnant) costs, and an extreme aversion to risk. Meanwhile, other industries such as consumer electronics see 
development cycles between 3-6 months, exponentially lowering costs per unit capability and a more lenient attitude 
towards risk. Why aren’t these trends seen more widely in the space industry? Based on our experience with the 
NASA “PhoneSat 1.0” mission and the joint SSTL and Surrey Space Centre “STRaND-1” mission, we explore the 
possibilities that arise by adopting and exploiting innovations from outside industries. The smartphone technology 
central to both our efforts is a good example, with the smartphone industry investing billions of dollars to produce 
robust, tightly packaged devices with very high levels of capability. Using this technology as-is offers many benefits 
for space applications. These include leveraging widespread open source software, the opportunity for extreme rapid 
prototyping, and faster, cheaper missions with potentially higher capability. Significantly, this approach dictates a 
new paradigm with different rules where the large consumer electronics industry leads and the space sector follows. 
There is room for greater risk tolerance, spacecraft can be disposable (while still being mindful of debris issues). 
They can be designed, built and be flight ready on very tight timescales (days or weeks), and also launched in great 
quantities (hundreds, thousands), offering technological and responsive capabilities not feasible today. They integrate 
more advanced multi-core technologies. The fast iteration time-scales of the hardware coupled with open source 
software and open hardware platforms also allow for rapid prototyping and testing of spaceflight software. The 
capability for fast release cycles is something not typically seen in space-flight software. Smartphones in particular 
offer standardized platforms for software development, as well as very large communities of talented programmers. 
This allows the focus of innovation to ultimately shift away from the hardware, and further into the software and 
information technology domains. The open source aspects of our efforts also open up the opportunity for many 
people to undertake their own space exploration, from school students to hobbyists. While CubeSats and other 
opportunities have been possible for some time, it is only through this approach that we are capable of easily 
producing high-capability spacecraft within the means of ordinary people. This means that their efforts are also 
meaningful, and could provide valuable contributions to science and human well being on Earth.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the potential for using low-cost, 
modern electronics in spacecraft, thereby breaking the 
vicious cycle of “designing for space”, “space 
qualification” and providing the benefits of tracking the 
bleeding edge of technology. It is a high-level and non 
technical account. We present based on our experiences 
and in particular the of our respective spacecraft 
projects, STRaND-1 mission* being developed by 
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) and Surrey 
Space Centre (SSC) at the University of Surrey in the 
                                                            
* C. P. Bridges, S. Kenyon, C. I. Underwood, M. N. 
Sweeting, "STRaND: Surrey Training Research and 
Nanosatellite Demonstrator", 1st IAA Conference on 
University Satellite Missions and CubeSat Workshop, 
24-29 January 2011, Rome, Italy 
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United Kingdom, and the PhoneSat Project† being 
developed by NASA Ames Research Center in the 
United States. Both projects started independently but 
both are attempting to use an Android-powered‡ 
smartphone as an element of the spacecraft avionics. In 
the case the PhoneSat project, the smartphone is the 
entire spacecraft flight computer and and avionics and 
in the case of STRaND it is a supplemental payload -- 
and there are advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach. However, with this general direction, both 
projects are attempting to leverage the billions of dollars 
invested in the minaturization of computer processing 
and Micro-electro-mechanical Systems (MEMS) 
sensors inside a modern smart phone, thereby allowing 
ultra-cheap, high capability spacecraft to be built with 
minimal effort. 
  
NASA Phonesat 
PhoneSat is a project initiated at the NASA Ames 
Research Center in early 2009, to investigate whether 
Commercial  off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and in 
particular a smartphone, can be used as the basis of a 
capable and ultra low-cost bus. The Nexus One 
smartphone used provides the core functionally of 
PhoneSat 1.0, which utilizes the phone’s integrated 1 
GHz processor, 500 MB of RAM, 16 GB SD card, 5 
Megapixel camera, 3-axis accelerometer, 3-axis 
magnetometer, and the open-source Android operating 
system. With the use of a single phone, the PhoneSat 
project hopes to demonstrate that the entire core 
componentry of a spacecraft can be purchased for under 
US$5,000. The PhoneSat project hopes to launch the 
first of these spacecraft in late 2011.  
 
The STRaND Mission 
STRaND stands for Surrey Training, Research and 
Nanosatellite Demonstration, and the aims of the 
programme are synonymous with the acronym. The 
programme was initiated to give less-experienced 
engineers and researchers the chance to gain new skills, 
develop new, innovative nanosatellite technologies with 
the possibility of commercialisation by SSTL, challenge 
the traditional SSTL approach and the processes that 
have developed in SSTL over the last 25 years, and 
perhaps most importantly to maintain the formal and 
informal links between SSTL and SSC at all levels of 
both organisations. The STRaND Nexus One is 
considered one of many payloads on a typical 3U 
CubeSat along with other COTS components. The first 
                                                            
† M. Safyan et al, “PhoneSat: a smartphone-based 
spacecraft bus”, International Astronautical Congress, 
Cape Town, South Africa, October 2011, IAC-11-
B4.6.B9 (10655) 
‡ Android Developers website 
http://developer.android.com/  accessed 13 Sept 2011 
satellite, STRaND-1, has a 40 MHz ARM7 on-board 
computer which control attitude and orbit control 
software (AOCS), nano-magnetorquer rods, nano-
reaction wheels, pulsed-plasma thrusters (PPTs), GPS 
receiver, butane thruster, 155 MHz ARM9 computer 
which runs a real-time Linux kernel, and the Nexus One 
smartphone payload. 
 
Dilemma: why has this not been done to date? 
If there are such obvious advantages of using 
consumer electronics over traditional space electronics – 
in terms of basic price performance metric – then why 
has this not been done to date? This is the dilemma. 
There are three major thrusts that may explain this 
dilemma: 
1. Risk Aversion. The space sector has too much 
inertia to jump to such a radical new solution 
space with no qualification in the harsh 
environment of space.  
2. Technological Maturity. Integrated devices with 
the necessary technologies are only just coming-
of-age. 
3. No need. Some parts of the space sector just do 
not need more advanced processors and sensors.  
But in addition, there is evidence to suggest that the 
dilemma as stated is not correct; it is starting to break: 
4. Our efforts in this direction are not completely 
isolated or new; in fact others are pursuing this 
vector. § 
Our conclusion is that this is an idea whose time has 
come, and it rapidly is garnering increasing interest 
from various groups around the world. We shall address 
each of these issues below. 
 
 
II.  RISK AVERSION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES 
  
For decades the space sector has built up more and 
more risk aversion. This is true in military, civil and 
commercial space sectors and globally. In the case of 
NASA, risk is typically mitigated through additional 
engineering. The public visibility of NASA's activities 
and the perception of wasted taxpayer funds put NASA 
in a situation where any failure is a public relations 
nightmare, and so staggeringly expensive engineering is 
                                                            
§ For example for a list of similar activities see 
http://www.nasahackspace.org/cellphonessmartphones/  
or various press  e.g. “Mobile Phone to Blast into 
Orbit”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-
environment-12253228, BBC News 23rd January 2011, 
or “Ground Control to Major Smartphone? NASA 
Wants Phones to Pilot Spaceships”,  
http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/02/11/cell-
phones-space-smartphone-nasa/, FoxNews 11th 
February 2011 
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exhausted in an attempt to almost totally eradicate risk 
on each mission. 
Commercial industry typically is slightly more 
tolerant to risk, but not much more so. Industry manages 
risk with a combination of engineering, insurance and in 
some cases a measure of redundancy. Expensive 
insurance policies ensure that a second chance can be 
had in the event of a total failure. However, to reduce 
insurance premiums, engineering risk reduction is also 
required along similar lines to NASA. In addition, since 
governments remain the primary purchaser of space 
capabilities, companies are often beholden to the 
Government risk posture, and often adhere to it 
conservatively. Even the ‘real’ commercial side of the 
industry is also not immune to the "cannot fail 
mentality". Surrey Satellite Technology Limited, for 
example, has a perfect flight record having never lost a 
satellite in the history of the company. Surrey has a 
desire to maintain that record, and so a culture has 
evolved whereby the company arguably takes 
significantly less risks than they did at their founding 20 
year ago. They make advances as technology from 
Surrey Space Centre matures and can be utilised in 
newer spacecraft. Other strategies such as trading risk 
for redundancy through multiple units or shifting to a 
paradigm of disposable units are essentially contrary to 
the postures of these entities. 
Another significant component is the expense of 
launch, which causes a vicious cycle consisting of two 
parts. Firstly, rockets are fundamentally expensive. This 
was the case right from the start of the space age. This 
cost incentivised the satellite developers to optimise 
their designs very carefully for the mission.†† Thus, the 
costs of the satellite go up to ensure that their 
probability of success is very high, and that they last a 
long time since the launch is expensive so doing it 
repeatedly is too dear.  
The cost of the rocket goes up to ensure that it is has 
high enough reliability to not waste the great 
expenditure on the satellite. This has led to a situation 
where the typical rockets used by the US government 
and major commercial space sector costs have seen 
consistently rising costs despite widespread deflation 
being seen by other industries. The current situation is 
that launches now typically cost $50-300m, and 
satellites typically cost $200-600m. 
 
The Challenge of Doing Something New 
As mentioned, this cycle of spiralling costs is 
accompanied by considerable aversion to technical risk 
and a desire to eliminate it entirely. The main 
                                                            
†† Note that early in the space age the spacecraft 
typically cost much less than the launch vehicle, today it 
is the reverse, such that the great expense of the rocket 
is not wasted on a spacecraft that didn't work. 
manifestation of this is the phenomenon of "space 
qualification", whereby satellite manufacturers 
essentially forbid the use of components that have not 
been proven to already work in space. Few 
organisations have risk-tolerant technology 
development programmes to specifically try out new 
technologies and methods, and thus we have a catch-22. 
Adoption of new techniques becomes extremely 
challenging in this environment. In addition, the 
timeframe for development of most satellites is 3-7 
years from authority to proceed to launch, and so there 
is a further lag in the technologies that are incorporated 
into the design (often ‘frozen in’ to the design in the 
first year or two).  
Adding the desire to only use flight proven 
technology, and the development timeframe, combine to 
result in satellites using components that tend to be 10-
15 years behind the latest that is available. Most 
technologies in satellites are worse than obsolete when 
they launch when compared to technology readily 
available commercially. For example, the recent NASA 
Phoenix mission to Mars launched in 2008, had a 
33MHz processor with 128 MB of RAM. This is in a 
day where commercially a CPU with 30x that speed and 
10x the RAM can be readily purchased at low cost. 
The state of the space sector thus described has a 
very high inertia toward established practices and 
known, safe technologies, and a corresponding 
resistance to new technologies. The whole space sector 
finds it hard to move away from the >$100m satellite 
model. The idea of $10k satellites is so far from their 
realm of thinking that most engineers currently in the 
space sector cannot even take it seriously, whilst those 
outside the sector somehow think that space is really 
hard and impenetrable (which historically it has been 
but may not be now).  
 
 
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY: RECENT 
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 
 
We now turn to our second argument against the 
dilemma, asserting that integrated devices with the 
necessary technologies are only just coming of age. It is 
only in recent years that a large fraction of the 
technology needed for a satellite has become housed 
into a single small commercial device. Today’s smart 
cell phones, for example, have most of the core 
capabilities of a spacecraft, including a fast processor 
(in fact, faster than that in most spacecraft launched 
today) and large memory capacity; a range of sensors 
such as accelerometers, rate gyros, magnetometers (all 
useful for attitude control) and GPS (for position); 
batteries and power management; several radios; and 
high resolution cameras. Companies investing in them, 
such as Apple, Google, HTC, Nokia, Motorola, etc, 
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have squeezed sophisticated capability into a small, 
physically robust form-factor, and mass-produced them, 
lowering the cost. They do lack some capabilities 
needed for a satellite for example solar panels, and a 
propulsion system; but remarkably the overlap with the 
basic feature list for a satellite is very high indeed. But 
this did not used to be the case: they have only gained 
these capabilities relatively recently. The first phone 
with a camera integrated was the Ericsson P800 in 
2000; the first with a fast (300 MHz) processor was in 
2004(?) with the Palm Treo; in 2007 came the first with 
GPS (Nokia N95) and with accelerometers (iPhone1); 
and in 2009 rate gyros (e.g. iPhone2). 
       So, in sum, it has literally only very recently 
been the case that one could buy a device with such 
sophistication and capabilities that it is close to that of a 
satellite bus (bar solar panels).  
 
 
VI.  NO NEED FOR FASTER PROCESSORS 
 
       But despite these recent developments, the space 
community are far from flying the latest technology and 
still aim to fly expensive, and often obsolete, slower 
devices; for a number of reasons. And one legitimate 
reason one can find is that there is no direct need or 
advantage for these particular technological advances. 
Take a commercial GEO telecommunications satellite 
as an example:  the main payload is a bent pipe RF link, 
where the bulk of the data is not passed through any 
processor. Thus there is little to be gained for the 
payload to have a more advanced processor. Meanwhile 
the bus has adequate functionality with an old slow 
processor to do its job. And since the payload remains 
massive and expensive, and the cost of the launch is 
high, there is little to be gained in cost savings by going 
to new avionics system – the mass savings are minimal 
overall mass and the cost savings are minimal compared 
to the overall cost. Thus there are genuinely classes of 
space assets for which these technologies serve to do 
little to advance, at least on the face of it. 
 
 
V. EMERGING INTEREST IN LOW-COST 
SPACECRAFT 
 
Finally then, there is the counter argument to the 
dilemma: although no actor has implemented it to its 
full potential, several are pursuing it and more are 
joining.  
The most obvious case already presented is that both 
SSC/SSTL and NASA conceived of their smartphone-
based projects independently and within a short time of 
one another.  Although taking a different approach, 
SSC, SSTL and NASA have similar motivations for 
going in this direction: commercial technology is now 
so good it is able to make satellites orders of magnitude 
cheaper. They have also both homed in on the very 
same smartphone -- the Google Nexus 1. 
But these actors are far from alone: others have 
started small companies also on a similar direction, 
albeit at an early stage of development. These include 
Satellogic‡‡, formed out of Singularity University, and 
Arkyd§§, the founders of which we know personally. 
Limited online information says "Arkyd Inc., an 
aerospace startup applying disruptive technologies for 
the commercial robotic exploration of space". An 
additional list of phone-related activities can be found in 
the footnote†††. Finally, DARPA’s System F6 (Future, 
Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, Free-Flying Spacecraft 
United by Information Exchange) programme -- which 
seeks to “demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of a 
satellite architecture wherein the functionality of a 
traditional “monolithic” spacecraft is delivered by a 
cluster of wirelessly-interconnected modules capable of 
sharing their resources and utilizing resources found 
elsewhere in the cluster” -- is pursuing a similar 
direction of consumer electronics and redundant 
constellation systems with some of its investments‡‡‡. 
 
 
VI. THE DOWNSIDES 
 
Of course there are some potential disadvantages of 
these electronics.  
 
Radiation tolerance 
The larger the device layout, the more immune it is 
against radiation effects such as total ionising dose 
(TID). Newer terrestrial devices, albeit optimised for 
power, may still consume as much due to the clock 
frequency. Additionally, if a single effect event (SEE) 
occurs where a high-energy particle passes through 
electronics, volatile memory areas such as SRAM or 
caches can become corrupt. Given the multi-layer 
device layout architectures of modern smartphones and 
the reduction in gate size, instead of a few corrupt 
locations, there could be a larger number of corrupt 
addresses. There are key challenges requiring research 
in high-density COTS devices to how their behaviours 
change in hostile environments before they are fully 
adopted by the space community. 
                                                            
‡‡ Satellogic website: 
http://satellogic.com/#782/tumblr  
§§ Arkyd Website: http://arkyd.com/ & 
http://www.naymz.com/chris_lewicki_3472626 
††† 
http://www.nasahackspace.org/cellphonessmartphones/  
‡‡‡ DARPA System F6 website: 
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Syste
mf6/System_F6.aspx  
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Mission Applicability 
There are constraints limiting mission applicability. 
In the discussion so far, we have concerned ourselves 
with the applicability of consumer electronics to space 
missions in general. But if one focuses down to the 
areas where there are projects attempting to use them 
today, one notices that it is mainly in the domain of 
cubesats. As detailed elsewhere, the CubeSat form 
factor leads to various limitations. In particular, these 
platforms tend to be power and data rate limited and 
thus only a certain class of small, low lass, low power 
and low data rate payloads are tenable. For example 
large optics are not possible, or large power amplifiers 
for high throughput communications satellites are not 
possible. So these are not going to replace Hubble or a 
standard GEO telecommunications anytime soon.  
Basically the advantages of consumer electronics are 
not applicable (at least currently) to all of the broad 
range of space missions – many of which are held back 
by the fact that core components are not undergoing 
similar advances in terms of price performance, size and 
cost. If a payload for a mission still requires 60W of 
power, is 100kg, costs $30m and needs little or no 
processing power – and there are no commercial 
electronics versions of these currently – then one cannot 
reap many of the benefits of the lower cost and more 
advanced processing found in consumer electronics for 
the satellite bus nor the advantages of moving to a 
smaller platform since the payload dictates otherwise.  
On the other hand, a myriad of instruments do fit 
into this class, e.g. magnetometers and radios, retro 
reflectors and atomic clocks. A whole range of science 
missions can be done with such systems as well as 
operational capabilities. For example small platforms 
can do a large constellation heliophysics mission, or 
geodetic missions or even could create a cheaper global 
navigation system or a low bandwidth communications 
network. And where the missions can be done this way, 
there are considerable cost advantages. Moreover, many 
instruments are getting smaller, cheaper, less power, as 
well as becoming more readily available commercially 
at low cost. Thus with time also and so the number of 
missions that these satellites could do is increasing with 
time also. 
 
 
VI. WHAT DOES “FOLLOWING” MEAN FOR 
THE SECTOR? 
 
What are the lessons from these observations and 
research developments? What actions could those 
interested in this be approach embrace? Here are a few:  
1. Take lead from other industries, enabling: 
a. Access to latest technologies 
b. Leverage their investments 
c. Stay on their development curves 
d. Ease of upgrade path 
e. No lock in - either from a given 
industry or vendor 
2. Make use of public APIs, open standards,  
a. Favour open technologies with open 
standards 
b. Do not invent in space proprietary 
standards 
3. Vendor agnostic – one can change to another 
supplier, or another design all together 
 
All of these recommendations are already to some 
extent followed in the sector. For example, the use of 
COTS devices and modified Internet protocols is found 
on SSTL satellites. But not to the radical extent 
proposed in the PhoneSat and STRaND missions. The 
pros and cons of this approach ultimately end in a trade-
off in a number of areas including cost, risk, capability, 
and security. Leveraging newer cutting-edge 
technologies will be cheaper and more capable at the 
price of higher probability of failure. Whilst more 
bespoke, proven, and expensive devices are lower 
probability of failure. When assessing these two 
processes in time, both have their own development 
cycle but terrestrial open-source technologies can 
leverage existing support/forums and developer 
experiences that bespoke space systems cannot. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, for space to learn to follow other 
industries will mean adopting open standards rather than 
inventing narrow-space only ones, and leveraging the 
latest technology as it becomes available. In our 
opinion, the risk will be higher but the rewards of 
tracking the high investment underlying phenomena of 
Moore’s law§§§ will result in a huge net win for space 
actors taking this approach. Ultimately one can envision 
a situation where space may transform into a software 
dominant domain where rapid innovation in software 
dominates the advancement of the sector rather than 
hardware capabilities. Future research and exotic 
mission scenarios will soon be feasible as space 
accelerates its development and applications for 
exploring our world and solar system. 
                                                            
§§§ Gordon E. Moore "Cramming more components 
onto integrated circuits". Electronics, Volume 38, 
Number 8, April 19, 1965. 
